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The Persistence of White Privilege 
Stephanie M. Wildman∗ 
Barbara Flagg published her landmark article, Was Blind, But 
Now I See, in 1993.1 The article, later developed into a book,2 named 
the common white tendency not to think about whiteness as the 
“transparency phenomenon.” As Flagg explained, white people have 
an option, every day, not to think of themselves in racial terms.3 “In 
fact, whites appear to pursue that option so habitually that it may be a 
defining characteristic of whiteness: To be white is not to think about 
it.”4 Flagg identified this “tendency for whiteness to vanish from 
whites’ self-perception” as a transparency approach.5 
Flagg’s essay, on the cutting edge of legal scholarship, contributed 
to the body of work that has developed into critical white studies. 
Indeed many of the authors in this symposium have contributed to 
expanding the knowledge and awareness about whiteness and the 
privileges associated with being white.6 Reflecting on the 
development of critical white studies, Eric Arnesen says that the 
influence of this scholarship has been profound, but he also faults 
 ∗ Copyright © 2005 Stephanie M. Wildman, Professor of Law and Director, Center for 
Social Justice and Public Service, Santa Clara University. Thank you to Margalynne 
Armstrong, Richard Delgado, Barbara Flagg, Sharon Hartmann, Colleen Hudgens, Patricia 
Leary, Martha Mahoney, Beverly Moran, Margaret Russell, Alan Scheflin, and Michael 
Tobriner for support and commentary and to Sharon Bashan, John Lough, Jr., Priya Moore, 
Sylvia Pieslak, and Ellen Platt for research assistance. Thank you to the Santa Clara University 
School of Law Faculty Scholarship Support Fund for assistance in completing this project. 
 1. Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993). 
 2. BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND THE LAW (1998). 
 3. Flagg, supra note 1, at 969. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. The term “privilege” remains problematic, since privilege can connote a reward for an 
earned achievement. White privilege is not earned. Yet academic discourse has widely adopted 
the phrase “white privilege,” and, increasingly, more popular circles recognize it as well. An 
internet search of the phrase, conducted on April 13, 2005, yielded over 102,000 web sources. 
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critical white studies for creating a “moving target” as to the meaning 
of whiteness:7 
Whiteness is, variously, a metaphor for power, a proxy for 
racially distributed material benefits, a synonym for “white 
supremacy,” an epistemological stance defined by power, a 
position of invisibility or ignorance, and a set of beliefs about 
racial “Others” and oneself that can be rejected through 
“treason” to a racial category.8 
Arnesen characterizes the political drift of this work as defined by 
“the voluntary mass relinquishing of privilege and identity.”9 He 
fears that those skeptical of the persistence of privilege regard this 
prescription for change as “envisioning [that] the withering away of 
whiteness requires nothing but imagination.”10 
Arnesen is correct that more than imagination will be necessary 
for any “withering away” of white privilege to occur. White privilege 
persists. Identifying the reasons for the persistence of white privilege 
is a necessary precursor to combating it. Both material conditions and 
socio-cultural factors contribute to the resilience of white privilege.  
WHITE PRIVILEGE 
Peggy McIntosh’s widely acknowledged definition of white 
privilege emphasizes the benefit that privilege bestows upon the 
individual holder. She explains that white privilege can be likened to 
“an invisible package of unearned assets.”11 The holder of this 
package remains oblivious to its presence, yet can reliably depend on 
its contents. McIntosh continues: “White privilege is like an invisible 
weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, 
 7. Eric Arnesen, Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination, 60 INT’L LAB. & 
WORKING-CLASS HIST. 3 (2001) (emphasizing the impact of whiteness studies on labor 
history). 
 8. Id. at 9. 
 9. Id. at 8. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming 
to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in LESLIE BENDER & DAAN 
BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 23 (1995).  
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guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency 
gear, and blank checks.”12  
The significance of white privilege, on a personal level, does not 
go far enough to explain why privilege persists. The systemic nature 
of white privilege beyond the individual also must be examined.13 
The Latin root of the word privilege, “privilegium,” means a law 
affecting an individual.14 Thus, the core meaning of privilege 
encompasses both the individual beneficiary and the systemic nature 
of the benefit. While privilege serves the individual holder, it is the 
systemic nature of privilege, McIntosh’s “invisible knapsack” 
multiplied throughout the group of white people, that supplies its 
societal force. Characteristics of the privileged group define the 
societal norm. From “flesh-colored” bandages or crayons and “nude” 
hosiery that depict fair skin15 to standardized testing,16 individual 
members of society are judged against characteristics held by the 
privileged. Furthermore, privileged group members can rely on this 
privilege to avoid objecting to oppression or subordination.17 Those 
with privilege can afford to look away from mistreatment that does 
not affect them personally. The conflation of privilege with the 
societal norm and this option to ignore oppression contribute to the 
invisibility of that privilege both to its holder and to society.18 
A body of scholarship has explored the privileging dynamic.19 Yet 
white privilege persists. Given this information and understanding 
 12. Id. McIntosh lists “special circumstances and conditions” that she did not earn but has 
been made to feel entitlement for. Her African American co-workers, friends and acquaintances 
cannot count on these same circumstances and conditions. See also Stephanie M. Wildman, 
Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o Critical Theory, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 307 (1997) 
(listing circumstances and conditions that Latina/os cannot count on). 
 13. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, 
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS, & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED]. 
 14. Id. at 13. 
 15. Id. at 29. 
 16. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between 
Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997). 
 17. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 16–17. 
 18. Id. at 13–14.  
 19. See MAURICE BERGER, WHITE LIES: RACE AND THE MYTHS OF WHITENESS (1999); 
FLAGG, supra note 2; RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1997); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN 
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about privilege, why does it remain so easy for white people to move 
through the world and not be aware of the presence and operation of 
their privilege? The transparency phenomenon that Flagg identified 
certainly contributes to the persistence of white privilege. After all, if 
whites do not see whiteness, they cannot see the privileges associated 
with it. But other dynamics join with transparency to create a 
reinforcing structure for the perpetuation of white privilege.  
MATERIAL CONDITIONS AND SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS 
REINFORCE WHITE PRIVILEGE  
Both material and socio-cultural factors combine to entrench 
white privilege. Material forces rooted in the physical world, such as 
the distribution of societal goods and resources, the division of labor, 
and immigration policies, create a world that privileges whiteness.20 
Socio-cultural factors, including discursive practices, patterns of 
behavior, and the thinking patterns that language creates, further 
strengthen white privilege, contributing to its endurance.21 
WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); THOMAS ROSS, 
JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS (1996); PRIVILEGE REVEALED, 
supra note 13; Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603 
(1999); McIntosh, supra note 11; Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and 
Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: 
Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309 (2000); 
Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine 
MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993). 
 20. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, 
and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2280 (2001) (urging 
consideration of the material factors that contribute to race and racism, including 
socioeconomic competition, immigration pressures, the search for profits, and changes in the 
labor pool). 
 21. Socio-cultural forces may operate indirectly. Political scientist Steven Lukes 
articulates mechanisms through which dominant forces maintain political power. STEVEN 
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974). Lukes’ second dimension of power includes social 
values and institutional practices that suppress conflict, keeping “certain interests and issues out 
of the political sphere altogether.” Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from 
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 748. Lukes’ third dimension also 
involves more subtle mechanisms “that place individuals and communities in circumstances 
where they are constrained from clearly asserting their own interests.” Id. at 751. This 
constraint is accomplished by socializing subordinated groups into “the norms and practices of 
the dominant culture. . . . They [subordinated groups] are taught to perceive, remember, 
imagine the world as though things cannot—and should not—change.” Id. at 751–52. See also 
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/11
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Commentators have expressed concern about the focus in recent 
scholarship on identity politics at the expense of analysis of those 
material conditions.22 Yet those material conditions and socio-
cultural patterns of behavior work in tandem to reinforce white 
privilege. 
Material forces that privilege whiteness permeate society,23 but 
remain largely unknown and invisible. A detailed exposition of these 
material forces requires book-length treatment, but a few examples 
illustrate the scope and power of these material conditions. Scholars 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 109–11 (2002) (discussing Lukes’ dimensions of power 
and the role of cultural mythology in maintaining domination). 
 22. See Delgado, supra note 20; Nancy Fraser, Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical 
Reading of Iris Young’s, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, 3 J. OF POL. PHIL. 166 
(1995); Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-
Socialist’ Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 68. But see Iris Marion Young, Unruly Categories: A 
Critique of Nancy Fraser’s Dual Systems Theory, 222 NEW LEFT REV. 147 (Mar./Apr. 1997) 
(discussing Nancy Fraser’s critique of Young’s work for focusing on identity politics and 
failing to address the political economy). This article sides with Young in refusing to accept the 
dichotomization of culture and economy. Young observes:  
From Zapatista challengers to the Mexican government, to Ojibwa defenders of fishing 
rights, to African-American leaders demanding that banks invest in their 
neighbourhoods, to unions trying to organize a Labor Party, to those sheltering 
battered women, resistance has many sites and is often specific to a group without 
naming or affirming a group essence. Most of these struggles self-consciously involve 
issues of cultural recognition and economic deprivation, but not constituted as 
totalizing ends. None of them alone is ‘transformative,’ but, if linked together, they 
can be deeply subversive. Coalition politics can only be built and sustained if each 
grouping recognizes and respects the specific perspective and circumstances of the 
others . . . .  
Id. at 160. 
 23. For a breathtaking summary of “the way things are” that privilege maleness, see 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (1989). 
 Men’s physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define insurance 
coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and 
successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in 
scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their military service 
defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each 
other—their wars and rulerships—defines history, their image defines god, and their 
genitals define sex. 
Id. Male privilege defines these vital aspects of American culture from a male point of view, 
which then becomes the measure for all of society. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 
15. The breadth of male privilege, illustrated by this quotation explaining the manner in which 
it defines societal norms, is a useful reference point for beginning to analyze the scope of white 
privilege. McIntosh, supra note 11. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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have documented the construction of white suburbs, explaining that 
federal policy excluded African Americans from the opportunity to 
buy housing even as these policies subsidized white buyers.24 The 
building of the interstate highway system had a “dramatic and lasting 
impact on the late twentieth-century urban United States.”25 While 
the highway project assisted suburban growth, it also decimated 
inner-city housing.26 According to Raymond Mohl, “[P]ostwar 
policymakers and highway builders used Interstate construction to 
destroy low-income and especially black neighborhoods in an effort 
to reshape the racial landscapes of the U.S. city.”27 Educational 
policies in the United States, from segregation in education28 to 
exclusion from the legal profession,29 have constructed and 
reinforced white privilege. The repercussions of these policies 
continue today, manifested by the increase of white wealth30 and 
well-being.31 
Socio-cultural factors, such as societal practices and thinking 
patterns, including language itself, operate in conjunction with 
 24. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); 
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995); Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property 
Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1999); Mahoney, Segregation, 
Whiteness, and Transformation, supra note 19; Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About 
Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665 (2002). 
 25. Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The Interstates and Central City Housing, in 
FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 226, 226 (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 2000). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential 
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996); Bryan K. Fair, Taking 
Educational Caste Seriously, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1843 (2004). 
 29. William C. Kidder, The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred, 29 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 547 (2004); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of 
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000); Roithmayr, supra note 16. 
 30. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 24; Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential 
Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 
1199 (2001); Study Says White Families’ Wealth Advantage Has Grown, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 
2004, at A13 (net worth of white households eleven times greater than Latino households and 
over fourteen times greater than Black households).  
 31. See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIND SOCIETY (2003); LIPSITZ, supra note 19. 
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material forces to reinforce white privilege, enabling whites to self-
perpetuate as a dominant racialized identity, albeit a transparent one. 
This article focuses on four of these socio-cultural factors: (1) the 
contemporary cultural push to colorblindness; (2) the sleight of 
mind32 that typifies the relation between an individual and groups in 
American culture; (3) a comfort zone in whiteness, which includes 
whiteness as the fabric of daily life for whites and white participation 
in the construction of race from a white-privileged viewpoint; and (4) 
the tendency for holders of white privilege to “take back the center” 
in discourse, turning attention away from potentially uncomfortable 
conversations about race toward an emphasis on white concerns and 
issues.33 These dynamics support the persistence of privilege. 
THE CONTEMPORARY PUSH TO COLORBLINDNESS 
Michael Omi recounts a conversation between Oakland, 
California, mayor Jerry Brown34 and two newspaper columnists about 
race.35 The reporters question Brown, asking whether his proposed 
redevelopment plan would predominantly benefit whites. Brown 
responds that race is “silly” because people have 99 percent the same 
DNA. Brown, who is white, acknowledges “a tradition and a history 
of racism and disadvantage and oppression,” but he asks, “when do 
you move on?”36 
 32. Sleight of hand is a conjuring trick that requires manual dexterity, whereas the 
individual-group dynamic, see infra notes 41–49 and accompanying text, is a mental trick. The 
phrase “sleight of mind” better captures the mental process that weaves between individuals and 
groups, occurring unnoticed. Thank you to Patricia Leary for suggesting this phrase.  
 33. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 90–93, for a discussion of “taking back 
the center,” explaining how the use of analogies in reasoning and conversation fuels that sense 
of entitlement. 
 34. Edmund G. (“Jerry”) Brown Jr. served as governor of California for eight years 
beginning in 1975. “He appointed an extraordinary number of women and minorities to high 
government positions, including the first woman, African-American and Latino to the 
California Supreme Court.” Jerry Brown, at http://oaklandnet.com/government/mayor/ 
biography.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005). In 1998, he was elected mayor of Oakland. Id.  
 35. Michael Omi, Rethinking the Language of Race and Racism, 8 ASIAN L.J. 161, 161–
62 (2001). 
 36. Id. at 161–62 (quoting Philip Matier & Andrew Ross, Long March, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 
10, 2000, at A17). Here is Omi’s description of the conversation and its context: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Omi recounts this story as emblematic of a new racial “common 
sense,” based on the premise that race is unimportant as a social 
category, because it lacks any biological basis.37 This racial “common 
sense” further assumes that the time has come to move beyond race 
and to emphasize colorblindness.38 Brown typifies the politician 
trying to be on the cutting edge of contemporary thought by tapping 
into an attitude that has intellectual currency. He is striving to 
demonstrate that he is “in vogue.” Unfortunately, behind the style 
points lies a serious wrongheadedness. Critiquing this colorblind 
view as failing to see racial inequality as structured, Omi urges 
particular attention to the use of terms like “race” and “racism.”39 The 
idea of colorblindness pushes any discussion toward a narrow view of 
discrimination, privilege, and subordination. It promotes an attitude 
that since society should not notice race, “we don’t have a problem” 
anymore.40 
In January of 2000, Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown was asked by San Francisco 
Chronicle political columnists Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross about his downtown 
revitalization plans. 
The following dialogue ensued: 
Matier & Ross: Some people say you’re just trying to bring 10,000 white people into 
the downtown with all these high-priced live-work lofts. 
Brown: How do you know what color they are going to be? 
Matier & Ross: Come on, who do you think lives in these lofts? 
Brown: Well, that's kind of a stigmatization of nonwhite people. There are African 
Americans, Chinese, Filipinos and there are white people—and by the way, race is just 
kind of silly anyway because 99 percent of our DNA is the same. 
Matier & Ross: Maybe, but race is still a part of politics—especially local politics. 
Brown: It’s a fact that is often manipulated and used. Yes, there is a tradition and a 
history of racism and disadvantage and oppression. But having said all that, when do 
you move on? And when do you try and pull it all together? 
Id. 
 37. Id. at 162. 
 38. Id. Omi comments, “Any hints of race consciousness are now suspiciously viewed as 
racist and impermissible in a good, just, and supposedly color-blind society.” Id. at 163. 
 39. Id. at 163. His essay concludes by discussing racial classification, the notion of racism 
as hate, and conflicts between communities of color. Id. at 163–67. 
 40. For additional critiques of the notion of colorblindness, see BROWN ET AL., supra note 
31; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE (1997); Neil Gotanda, A Critique 
of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/11
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INDIVIDUAL-GROUPS SLEIGHT OF MIND41 
Descartes’ famous quote, “I think therefore I am” epitomizes the 
individuality of Western liberal ideology.42 The individual is the 
center of that world. David Wilkins, reflecting on his visit to 
aboriginal peoples in Australia, suggests “I experience therefore I 
am” as a phrase more descriptive of the constitutive process that 
humans undergo in reacting to and learning from each other and the 
world around them.43 “I experience therefore I am” portrays the 
relational nature of individuals, who do not become who they are in 
isolation from each other or solely within the confines of the thinking 
brain. 
Understanding the persistence of privilege requires recognizing 
the sleight of mind that occurs on the subject of individuals as 
members of groups.44 We are each individuals, assured of individual 
rights. But sometimes we are group members, acting relationally. 
Understanding privilege requires conceptualizing individuals as part 
of groups.45 As john powell explains, “our personal relationships are 
mediated through power and institutional structures; privilege cannot 
be addressed at only the personal level.”46 Considering only the 
personal, individual holder of the knapsack of privilege results in 
missing a significant part of how privilege operates. The systemic, 
group aspect of privilege fortifies and maintains the societal 
advantage it bestows. The group “white” and individuals within it 
benefit from the normalization of these advantages in the material 
 41. See supra note 32 (explaining this phrase). 
 42. See ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-
STATE 110 (1999) (musing about Descartes’ phrase in relation to affirmative action). 
 43. David E. Wilkins, Keynote Address: A Constitutional Confession, 37 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 473, 475 (2003).  
 44. See john a. powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial 
Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 422 (2000); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege, Gender, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment: Reclaiming Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 709 (2004) (describing clash between individuals and groups in equal protection 
jurisprudence). 
 45. powell, supra note 44, at 449 (criticizing court decisions that “decontextualiz[e] 
people and groups of people, portraying them as self-created individuals who live outside of 
any social, historical, or political context”). See also Wildman, supra note 44. 
 46. powell, supra note 44, at 444 (citing IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIFFERENCE (1990)). 
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conditions of society. So, for example, “white” neighborhoods 
feature good schools, transportation, and commercial services that 
make it easier to negotiate life’s daily chores. 
This failure to engage the individual-group dynamic in relation to 
the notion of equality, generally, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
particular, has strengthened the likelihood that white privilege will 
flourish. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment does use the 
word “person”; it says: “No state shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”47 This language 
indicates the primacy of equal protection to individuals.  
 But the Supreme Court’s development of equal protection 
jurisprudence, while seeking to retain that primacy, has 
ignored the relationship of that individual person to the 
significant identity groups in which that individual might be a 
member. This failure to recognize the individual-group 
interrelation has resulted in a jurisprudence that makes no 
sense. It has created a body of decisional law resulting in 
whites suing with impunity as their charge of race 
discrimination finds ready remedy. Yet people of color 
claiming race discrimination, in a society that systemically 
privileges whiteness, find their pleas unheard.48 
Challenges to material conditions that facilitate the persistence of 
white privilege fail when legal analysis focuses solely on individuals 
and ignores group advantage. 
The ability to choose whether to focus on ourselves as individuals 
or as group members reinforces white privilege. Antidiscrimination 
laws, like Title VII, do recognize group membership, prohibiting 
discrimination against an individual because of that group 
identification. But the focus in antidiscrimination doctrine upon 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 48. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy, supra note 19; Wildman, supra note 44, at 711–12; 
see also Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative 
Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089 (2002) (suggesting viewing equal protection in terms of group 
status and competition). 
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individuals makes subordination and discrimination seem like 
anecdotal problems, veiling their systemic nature.49 
COMFORT ZONE IN WHITENESS 
Charles Lawrence described the existence of this comfort zone in 
whiteness from the position of an outsider, viewing it in a dream he 
had.50 In the dream two white colleagues are discussing his teaching 
future. Even though he is present, he is not visible to them; they 
speak as though he were not there.51 The two white colleagues create 
a community, sharing a comfort level in their interaction that is 
evident to him, even though they seem to be unaware of it as they 
converse. 
Martha Mahoney illustrates the manner in which this phenomenon 
operates from a white perspective in the context of residential 
segregation: 
[W]hen you wake up in the morning and go to the kitchen for 
coffee, you do not feel as if you hold partial interests or 
particular sticks in a bundle of rights in the structure you 
inhabit, nor does it feel as if land-use regulation shaped your 
structure, street, and community. This is home, where you roll 
out of bed, smell the coffee, reach for clothing, and inhabit the 
“reality” of the house. The physicality of home and community 
. . . tends to make our lived experience appear natural.52 
The white person’s lived experience, the fabric of daily life, 
emphasizes—and minute to minute recreates—the whiteness of the 
world. This whiteness is just normal—“the way things are.”53 But as 
 49. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13 at 25–41, for further discussion of 
antidiscrimination law, especially in the workplace context. 
 50. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as 
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2231 (1992). 
 51. Id. at 2231–32. 
 52. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, supra note 19, at 1661–62. 
 53. Id. at 1662. John O. Calmore emphasizes the segregation that created this white world: 
“[I]t is difficult for whites to appreciate the dehumanizing constraints and isolation of imposed 
segregation . . . . The compoundedness of race and space . . . for whites [is] taken for granted; 
white space is not problematic and black space is somewhere else.” John O. Calmore, 
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: “Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of 
Despair,” 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1995). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p245 Wildman book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
256 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 18:245 
 
 
 
Mahoney explains, “the way things are . . . tends to make prevailing 
patterns of race, ethnicity, power, and the distribution of privilege 
appear as features of the natural world.”54 The maintenance of 
whiteness, the re-creation of that community, remains unseen. 
Mahoney’s illustration of the white person waking up and 
smelling the coffee serves as an important reminder of the role we 
each play in constructing race from the world around us. Amy 
Kastely further elaborates on white participation in racial 
construction, using the example of Toni Morrison’s story Recitatif.55 
As Kastely explains: 
Recitatif draws attention to ways that race functions for 
informative purposes in contemporary written texts, as readers 
give significance to racial identification in matters of character, 
situation, and narrative movement and as they unconsciously 
or uncritically locate themselves in relation to race 
consciousness in the text.56  
In Recitatif, Morrison never identifies the characters’ races. Where 
racial ambiguity exists, the human mind makes its own assumptions, 
based on cues, categories, and stereotypes.57 The fabric of daily life 
for most whites, coupled with colorblindness and a focus on the 
individual, tilts white participation in the construction of race toward 
utilizing cues, categories, and stereotypes that maintain the privileged 
comfort zone. 
TAKING BACK THE CENTER 
Meetings, colloquies, and classrooms usually convene with an 
agenda that defines the purpose or center of discourse. White 
 54. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, supra note 19, at 1661–62. 
 55. Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race 
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994); see 
also Toni Morrison, Recitatif, in CONFIRMATION 243–61 (Amiri Baraka & Amina Baraka eds., 
1983). 
 56. Kastely, supra note 55, at 270–71. 
 57. Id. at 271 (“Recitatif invites readers to pay attention to the complex arrangements of 
raced and gendered tropes and codes that are, or are expected to be, quite clear to contemporary 
readers and to look closely at the construction of race we bring or perform as readers.”). 
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privilege has promoted a white sense of entitlement to place white 
concerns at the center of most agendas.58 
Members of dominant groups assume that their perceptions are the 
pertinent perceptions, that their problems are the problems that 
need to be addressed, and that in discourse they should be the 
speaker rather than the listener. . . .  
So strong is this expectation of holding center stage that even 
when a time and place are specifically designated for members of 
a nonprivileged group to be central, members of the dominant 
group will often attempt to take back the pivotal focus. They are 
stealing the center—usually with a complete lack of self-
consciousness.59 
This dominant white perspective, monopolizing the center of 
discourse, manifests itself in judicial form, when legal analysis takes 
the focus away from outrageous injustice. Decisions that parse an 
unjust situation to show how it differs from other cases that have 
found injustice resonate as a form of “taking back the center.” 
Minimizing or rejecting claims of racial injustice reinforces a white 
comfort zone. 
PRIVILEGE AND LAW 
Audiences at presentations and lectures about privilege frequently 
ask, “What does privilege have to do with law?” The fact that any 
analysis of privilege has been omitted historically from legal 
reasoning does not mean it could not be a useful lens, perhaps more 
useful than discrimination, for viewing fact patterns. The socio-
cultural factors, discursive practices, patterns of behavior, and 
thinking patterns created by language have resulted in an absence of 
an awareness of privilege in legal arguments. Courts’ failure to 
 58. One recent, well-publicized example of the battle to control the education agenda has 
been dubbed the “culture wars” that arose with introduction of non-white-centered history and 
literature on college campuses. See, e.g., HENRY L. GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE 
CULTURE WARS (1992); TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA 
IS WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995). 
 59. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 91. 
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recognize the privileging dynamic and to include it in legal analysis 
further perpetuates that privilege. 
Court decisions have recognized privilege without naming it as 
such. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter,60 one of the legal building 
blocks that led to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,61 
Thurgood Marshall and the lawyers who worked with him tackled 
inequality and segregation in legal education. Heman Marion Sweatt, 
who was African American, applied for admission to the University 
of Texas Law School. The school denied his application because it 
admitted only white students.62 The Court acknowledged the potential 
argument that no denial of equal protection had occurred because, 
just as Texas excluded African-American students from the 
University of Texas, it excluded white students from the School of 
Law of the Texas State University for Negroes, a black law school 
created in response to the litigation.63 In Sweatt, the Court stepped out 
of the traditional legal liberalism, “equal treatment” paradigm.64 The 
Court rejected the argument that excluding whites from an all black 
school paralleled excluding blacks from a white school. Rather the 
Court said that argument “overlook[ed] realities.”65 In Sweatt, the 
Court identified tangible and intangible factors that were important to 
a quality education, factors that related to privilege.66 Although the 
 60. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 62. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631 (at the time of the original lawsuit “there was no law school in 
Texas which admitted Negroes”). For biographic information on Heman Sweatt, see The 
Handbook of Texas Online, at http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/SS/ 
fsw23.html (last modified Mar. 8, 2005). 
 63. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633. 
 64. See PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 170–71 for a discussion of legal 
liberalism. 
 65. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
 66. The Court stated: 
[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white 
and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of 
courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the 
library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law 
School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School 
possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective 
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name 
but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position 
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is 
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Court did not use the term privilege, it recognized its existence in the 
form of tangible factors, like faculty, courses, and library, and 
intangible factors such as faculty reputation, administration 
experience, alumni influence, school tradition, and prestige. That 
recognition of privilege has been largely absent in post-Brown 
jurisprudence.67 
The absence of a privilege analysis in law can result in the 
perpetuation of injustice, as occurred in the case based on the 
following facts. In March 1995, Denise Arguello and her family, 
including her father Alberto Govea, stopped to purchase gas at a 
Conoco gas station in Fort Worth, Texas.68 After her husband 
pumped the gas, Ms. Arguello and her father entered the station’s 
convenience store to pay for the gas and to purchase beer. They 
waited in line while Cindy Smith, a clerk, helped other customers. 
Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith summarizes the testimony about 
what happened next: 
Arguello testified that Smith was rude to her when she reached 
the counter and that her demeanor was less friendly than it had 
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would 
consider the question close. 
Id. at 633–34. 
 67. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody’s Market: The Political Economy 
of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 247 (2000) (describing the dismantling of civil rights precedent); see also id. at 
974 (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 overturned aspects of American culture that 
had resulted in white privilege); cf. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using 
the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997) (urging a legislative rather than 
judicial focus for social change); see also id. at 974 (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 overturned aspects of American culture that had resulted in white privilege). 
 68. Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 2003). The absence of outrage 
surrounding this decision suggests it is unremarkable, part of “the way things are.” A few 
exceptions, expressing a sense of injury from the case include Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing 
Civil Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
989 (2004) and Allison McJunkin, Casenote, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 163 
(2004); see also Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to 
Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003) (citing facts of 
Arguello in notes). 
 Several surveys of franchise law do mention the case, see, e.g., Deborah S. Coldwell et al., 
Franchise Law, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1055, 1076 (2000); William L. Killion, Ellen R. Lokker, & 
Anne-Marie Gauthier, 2001 Franchising Currents, 20 WTR FRANCHISE L.J. 150, 152 (2001); 
see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1099, 1101 (2002) (citing Arguello as supporting the need for liability for trademark owners). 
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been with the customers she had previously served. After 
Arguello presented her credit card as payment, Smith 
requested identification. Arguello testified that Smith singled 
her out by demanding that she provide identification; Smith 
contends that she requested identification because Arguello 
was attempting to buy beer. 
 Arguello, an Oklahoma resident, presented Smith with her 
valid Oklahoma driver’s license. Smith initially refused to 
accept it, claiming she could not take an out-of-state license, 
but she eventually accepted it and completed the transaction. 
During Arguello’s purchase, Govea became increasingly 
frustrated with the manner in which Smith was treating his 
daughter. Consequently, he left the beer he had intended to 
purchase on the counter and walked out of the store. 
 After Smith completed Arguello’s sale, the tension between 
them escalated into a confrontation. Arguello testified that 
Smith began shouting obscenities at her and making racially 
derogatory remarks. [According to the trial court memorandum 
opinion Arguello alleged that “Smith referred to her as a ‘f* * 
*ing [sic] Iranian Mexican bitch.’”69] Arguello began to leave 
with her purchase, but realized that she had the wrong copy of 
the credit card slip and approached the counter again. After 
another argument, Arguello and Smith exchanged copies. As 
Arguello walked away the second time, Smith shoved a six-
pack of beer off the counter and onto the floor. 
 Plaintiffs testified that after Arguello left the store, Smith 
began screaming racist remarks over the intercom. At the same 
time, Smith laughed at Arguello and her family and made 
several crude gestures. Govea and other family members 
telephoned Conoco from a payphone outside the store to lodge 
a complaint. During that telephone conversation, the Conoco 
official indicated that he wanted to know the name of the clerk 
in question. When Govea attempted to re-enter the store to 
 69. 2001 WL 1442340, No. CIV.A. 397CV0638-H, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2001). 
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determine Smith’s name, Smith locked him out while laughing 
and making crude gestures.70 
Arguello and Govea sued claiming race discrimination under 
42 U.S.C. § 1981. A jury decided the case in their favor, but the 
district court granted Conoco’s motion for a judgment as a matter of 
law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling in favor of 
Conoco.71 
The Fifth Circuit began its decision by reviewing the elements of 
a § 1981 claim: 
[A] plaintiff must establish “(1) that she is a member of a racial 
minority; (2) that [the defendant] had intent to discriminate on 
the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one 
or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.”72 
The court acknowledged no dispute existed over plaintiffs’ status as 
racial minorities73 and that the evidence had been sufficient to create 
a jury question as to whether they had suffered discrimination during 
their visit to defendant’s store.74 The court stated: “this case turns on 
the third element, namely, whether Smith’s conduct implicated rights 
guaranteed by § 1981.”75 
Fifth Circuit law for establishing a denial of § 1981 rights in the 
retail setting requires evidence of an attempt to contract that was 
thwarted by the defendant merchant. The purchase must be thwarted, 
not merely deterred by the merchant.76 The Fifth Circuit stated that 
because Govea voluntarily left the beer on the counter and exited the 
 70. 330 F.3d at 356–57. 
 71. Id. at 362. 
 72. Id. at 358. 
 73. “The first element is not disputed—all parties concede that Arguello and Govea are 
Hispanic.” Id. 
 74.  
[T]he testimonial and other evidence provides a basis for concluding that Smith 
subjected Arguello to substandard service. In conjunction with that evidence of 
maltreatment, the testimony regarding the racially charged nature of Smith’s 
comments sufficed to create a jury question regarding whether Smith intentionally 
discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis of race. 
Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 359. 
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store without trying to buy it, the clerk Smith did not prevent Govea 
from making the purchase.77 The court similarly found Arguello 
without remedy because she did “successfully complete the 
transaction.”78 
Plaintiffs had argued for a broader interpretation of the statute that 
included “the making, performance, modification, and termination of 
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the contractual relationship.”79 The court declined to 
follow this proposed broader application. Rather, it distinguished case 
law involving both discriminatory service in restaurants and clubs80 
and other cases concerning discriminatory prepayment or check-
writing policies.81 
The lack of outrage surrounding the result illustrates another way 
that privilege operates. The decision does not merely reflect the view 
of an aberrational circuit court ignored by the Supreme Court in its 
denial of certiorari; the case also becomes precedent, setting the 
terms for appropriate future behavior. How will the general counsel 
of Conoco advise employees to act in the future?82 What advice 
might corporate counsel have given to employees if the result had 
come out differently? This decision permits subordination and abuse 
to continue without redress or even acknowledgment that it was 
wrong. That continuation reinscribes the white privilege that made 
the conduct and ensuing judicial decision possible. White privilege 
enabled the judges to cast Mr. Govea’s transaction as a voluntary 
withdrawal from purchasing beer. Most likely, the judges had been to 
convenience stores much like this one, but they probably had not 
been welcomed with racial epithets.83 Life lived in the white comfort 
zone made it easy for judges to miss the injustice. The judges likely 
experienced their own convenience store visits as individuals. As 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). 
 80. Id. at 360–61. 
 81. Id. at 361. 
 82. Thank you to Martha Mahoney for offering this insightful question. 
 83. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 1009 (“[W]hite judges may lack the experiences to be able 
to recognize the legal harms articulated in a consumer discrimination complaint. . . . [I]t is very 
likely that these are the same stores in which white upper-class males (like judges) shop without 
incident.”). 
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individuals they were unable to see the group identification that 
represents the lived reality for non-whites. That reality means not 
only facing this kind of harassment but also never knowing when it 
will strike as one goes about the business of life.84 That fear of a 
world gone awry, like a rug pulled from under one’s feet, has not 
been part of the white comfort zone. The push to colorblindness 
further supports law operating within these cultural practices to 
ignore the racialized reality in which the transaction took place. The 
judicial form of “taking back the center” maintains the status quo that 
led to the injustice. 
Until law and the legal system address scenarios like that faced by 
Ms. Arguello and Mr. Govea, subordinating practices will continue. 
This case suggests the limits of antidiscrimination law, which does 
seem fairly useless if its scope cannot comprehend the injustice 
apparent in this situation.85 Reflecting on the inexplicable unfairness 
of key judicial decisions, Jerome Culp asked: 
How do you defend the tests in Washington v. Davis, the 
decision in Bowers, or the rule in Korematsu, the failure to 
apply prior principles in McCleskey, or the reasoning in Shaw 
v. Reno?86  
He answers his question, “The court ultimately simply responds that 
we the white majority have the power to do what we want in these 
cases.”87 He reminds us that white judges, who do not face the same 
risk in making contracts as the Arguello family, have the power, 
reinforced by white privilege, to ignore the non-privileged reality. 
This failure to recognize privilege results in injustice like the 
Arguello case. 
 84. This family did not have same security a white family would have when traveling by 
car and stopping to purchase gas. See, e.g., PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 13, at 168–69 
(following the eviction of two families, one white and one African-American, the African-
American family has fewer options when seeking new housing than the white counterpart). 
 85. Wildman, supra note 44, at 711–12. 
 86. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
1637, 1669 (1999). 
 87. Id. 
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CONCLUSION  
Catharine Wells explains that judging is “an inherently situated 
activity.”88 According to Wells, a judge “cannot escape the effects of 
his or her own particular situation” in performing the task of 
judging.89 Wells relates Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s illuminating 
delineation of the situated nature of judging: 
There is in each of us a stream of tendency . . . which gives 
coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot 
escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives, 
forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have 
been tugging at them—inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, 
acquired convictions . . . . In this mental background every 
problem finds its settings. We may try to see things as 
objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them 
with any eyes except our own.90 
Wells argues that if judging is situated, judges must pay attention to 
their situation.91 But it is not only judges, but all of us with white 
privilege, whether we are decision makers, part of decision-making 
bodies, or comfortable individuals, who need to pay more attention. 
Paying attention means becoming more self-conscious about the 
ways “personal history, character, and outlook” impact the decisions 
and interactions with which we engage the world.92 Reaching that 
self-consciousness is more difficult from within the white comfort 
zone that emphasizes colorblindness and individualism. Combating 
the persistence of privilege requires self-consciousness about these 
socio-cultural patterns and the material conditions that maintain the 
 88. Catharine Pierce Wells, Improving One’s Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on 
the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323, 323 (1992); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial 
Diversity on the Bench, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000) (explaining that minority judges 
could enrich judicial decisionmaking as representatives of outsider perspectives); Catharine 
Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990) (discussing contextual 
decisionmaking). 
 89. Wells, Improving One’s Situation, supra note 88, at 324. 
 90. Id. at 323 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
12–13 (1921)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 324. 
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white privilege reality. Self-consciousness can be the first step toward 
action. 
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